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ABSTRACT 
Incentive based insurance (often called smart 
insurance), where the insured can affect the 
premium level and receive other benefits by her 
behavior and choices, is currently subject to 
considerable interest and product design activities 
by insurers. To study the opinions of Finnish 
customers on incentive based insurances we set up a 
survey. The respondents replied the nonlife 
insurance questions rather positively. Life insurance 
questions mostly received slightly positive scores, 
but problems exist. The student sample replied to 
the personal life related questions significantly more 
positively than the senior sample. This underlines 
the differences between these customer segments. 
The real win-win situation related to incentive based 
insurance was questioned by many respondents 
indicating cognitive biases. This study finds that 
successful development of incentive based 
insurance products requires that insurers study and 
test carefully their potential customers’ opinions. 
This emphasizes the role of experiments and 
inquiries. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the right level of the insurance premium? Traditionally, standard premiums are 
allocated to groups of insured units according to their average behaviour. For example, life 
insurance premium is defined according to the average mortality of the given group of 
insured persons. In this traditional form of premium rating membership in a certain group is a 
dominant factor, which is usually accompanied by other factors like age. It is customary that 
insured persons of the same age have to pay the same life insurance premium regardless their 
living habits (bad health often increases the premium or even results in declining the 
insurance). Intuitively it is clear that customers‟ good living habits decrease claims expenses. 
Would it be possible to take their living habits into account in premium rating, or even 
incentivize them to live healthier, and then reward them for doing so? In the same way the 
question of incentivizing a customer can be posed in non-life insurance. 
In insurance premium rating incentives have been used for a long time.  
They occur both in life and nonlife insurance sectors. Classic examples are the bonus/malus 
premium rating schemes in motor vehicle insurance. They can, indeed, promote careful 
driving, at least in theory. Additionally, they incentivize a customer not to report minor 
claims. This phenomenon is sometimes called “pseudo-deductibles”; see Kerr (2012). Lately 
a trend has appeared to incentivize the customer to affect by her behaviour the premium a bit 
more directly. Examples include the effect of driving behaviour on motor insurance and the 
so-called wellness or vitality concept connected to many life or health insurance products. 
The latter ones are often referred to as “smart life insurances”, although this term may also 
note other features like the easiness of buying insurance. 
These trends are possible because of the use of new technology to maximize the correlation 
of a premium and the corresponding risk, which has traditionally been one of the most 
important goals of insurance industry; see Dionne (2013). (E.g. in commercial insurance risk 
management measures decrease risk, which makes it possible to reduce the premium also.) 
As a concrete example, Nyce and Maroney (2011) show that more granular risk based pricing 
provides better incentives for homeowners regarding location and mitigation choices.  
We have chosen this topic as a research object because incentive based insurance can be 
found at many stages: bonus/malus schemes in motor insurance have existed for decades; 
wellness principle, that is, taking into account physical activity and health factors in health or 
life premium rating, is a new phenomenon but it is in practical use and spreading around the 
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world; and finally, using driving behaviour as a tariff factor is still at an experimental phase. 
Besides, it is interesting to discuss a subject which is equally relevant in life and nonlife 
insurance.  
It is also interesting to notice that the use of incentives is common in bancassurance 
environment. Buying an insurance product can be rewarded in the price of bank and other 
insurance products; or buying a banking product can result in a totally free insurance, at least 
for a certain time period. Using incentives in this way banks and insurance companies can 
affect their customers‟ cross-buying behaviour. This is an important underlying motive 
behind the formation of financial conglomerates; see e.g. Voutilainen (2005, 2006).  
2. Literature Review 
Incentive based insurance is a new phenomenon, and it has seldom been studied on an 
academic level. The texts found e.g. in the Internet are mostly related to product development 
or advertisement of existing products on the sites of insurance companies. Advertising 
effectiveness of life insurance is discussed by Fier and Pooser (2016). Theil (2003) finds out 
that the principles of judgement by representativeness and mental availability have insurance 
decisions and marketing implications. Market research and discussion on possible future 
products can also be found in the Internet. 
Customers‟ behaviour in buying insurances and attitude towards various options is related to 
psychological economics and experimental economics. A fundamental textbook on 
psychological economics is Earl (1988). Hey (2002) and Cox et al. (2015) use experimental 
economics in the context of risky decision making. Richter et al. (2014) discuss behavioural 
insurance both from theoretical and experimental points of view. Christiansen et al. (2016) 
study policyholder behaviour in health insurance. Policyholder behaviour in variable annuity 
contracts is covered by MacKay et al. (2015). 
Lambert et al. (2009) discuss the effect of fitness-related activities and medical claims. The 
relation between the participation in a health promotion programme and healthcare costs is 
studied by Patel (2010). The connection between the participation in an incentive-based 
health promotion program and hospital costs is discussed by Patel et al. (2010, 2011). The use 
of a wellness center can be a method to promote customers‟ health, and tickets to a wellness 
center can be part of a reward in incentive based insurance. Clark et al. (2011, 2013) study if 
the usage of a wellness center is associated with improved quality of life, stress level and 
health behaviours. 
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Among related literature in nonlife insurance one can mention Bair et al. (2012), who 
conclude that vehicle maintenance records predict automobile accidents, Kofman and Nini 
(2013) and Forsstedt (2014), who study information asymmetries in automobile insurance, 
and Aarbu (2015), who discusses asymmetric information in the home insurance market. One 
form of incentive based insurance is Pay-As-You-Drive, where insurance premiums are based 
directly on the amount a vehicle is driven during the policy term. Litman (2005) studies Pay-
As-You-Drive pricing and insurance regulatory objectives. He concludes that it tends to 
support insurance regulatory objectives including increased actuarial accuracy, increased 
insurance affordability, reduced uninsured driving, and reduced traffic accidents. It can also 
help achieve other social objectives, such as reduced traffic congestion and pollution 
emissions. 
Basic principles of insurance business are widely covered by Dionne (2013). Voutilainen 
(2006) discusses various aspects of financial conglomerates and more generally most 
preferred alliance models between banks and insurance companies. Voutilainen (2005) 
presents alternative alliance models and criteria for the selection between them. The problem 
of searching the most preferred alliance model by different decision making groups – 
business executives, supervisory authorities and customers – is covered by Korhonen and 
Voutilainen (2006), and Korhonen et al. (2006a, 2006b). 
Verhoef et al. (2001) and Kumar et al. (2008) show that customers‟ increased cross-buying is 
often a goal in financial alliances. Soureli et al. (2008) and European Commission (2003) 
study cross-buying in retail industries. 
Udoh and Safari (2016) show that banks have not done enough to close the gap of 
expectations from their customers regarding their service quality and e-service quality, 
compared to what the actual perception is for the customers.  
In the field of incentive based insurances early movers can be identified among insurers of 
different countries. We have not found academic literature on such early movers, but 
McShane et al. (2012) identify early mover advantages in the relatively young market of 
long-term care insurance. In Finland smart life insurances have been piloted by LocalTapiola 
(2016). 
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3. Research Plan 
To study the opinions of Finnish people on incentive based insurances we set up a survey 
consisting of general, nonlife specific and life specific questions during the autumn 2016. The 
survey questions are listed in Appendix 1. Although they cover both life and nonlife 
insurance, most of them deal with life insurance. Questions ask about agreement or 
disagreement with given statements (six classes with “1=definitely yes” and “6=absolutely 
not”). 
The sample was selected and contacted with the help of the statistical service centre (TUPA) 
at the University of Tampere (Finland). It is an unbiased sample of Finns as for income level, 
bank and insurance company relation, residence location, profession etc. We call this “the 
basic sample”, and the number of answers there was 127. 
In addition, a group of business degree students from the University of Tampere participated 
in the inquiry. They represent young people with high education level and their number was 
69. We call this “the student sample”. 
The basic sample represents the whole population of Finland while the student sample is 
limited to the University of Tampere. The average age is 58 in the basic sample and 24 in the 
student sample. In order to obtain reliable results with these relatively small samples the 
statistical tests were applied to dichotomized answers (“Yes”=answer 1-3 and “No”=answer 
4-6), and the respondents were encouraged to give a plenty of answers to open questions. 
4. Results 
Basic Sample: General Attitudes 
The general attitude (six classes; “1=definitely yes” and “6=absolutely not”) of the 
respondents towards the research questions was measured as the average answers in the basic 
sample, see Table 1. 
Table 1 
Basic Sample : General Attitude 
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The most favourable answers were given to statements: The bonus system in motor insurance 
is a good principle (N1; average 1,8); In motor insurance the driving habit should affect the 
premium (N3; average 2,3); In private household insurances (like e.g. home insurance) the 
same kind of bonus system as in motor insurance would be a good premium rating method 
(N4; average 2,3); Smoking/non-smoking should affect the premium of a life insurance (L4; 
average 2,3). 
This means that the respondents like the bonus system in motor insurance, they also think that 
the driving habit should affect the motor insurance premium, they think that same kind of 
bonus system would be good in private household insurances, and they think that smoking 
should affect the premium of a life insurance. This opinion is strong. The vast majority of 
respondents (81 %) think that the bonus system in motor insurance is really good (answer 1 
or 2). 
The worst assessment was given to statement: Residence location should affect the premium 
of a life insurance (L6; average 4,5). This means that they do not accept residence location as 
a tariff factor of a life insurance. Again, the opinion is strong. The majority of respondents 
(58 %) think that residence location as a tariff factor would be really bad system (answer 5 or 
6). 
For all other questions, the average answers range between 2,5 and 3,8. Since the answer 
scale was 1,…,6 with a mean of 3,5, the answers can be considered to be relatively 
favourable towards the survey questions. 
Implementing both life and nonlife incentive based insurance requires often the use of 
information technology (IT). For example, registering automobile driving behaviour or 
physical exercise of the insured is done with the help of IT devices. The acceptance of these 
kinds of insurances is related to the acceptance of IT in general. Vannoy and Palvia (2010) 
examine the adoption of IT in the context of social computing. As background information, 
Venkatesh et al. (2003, 2012) show that age and gender are significant variables in explaining 
IT acceptance. 
Basic Sample: Background Factors 
The differences between the answers of different respondent groups were statistically tested. 
The first comparison was made between female and male persons in the basic sample. 
Our hypothesis was that men are more interested in new features than women. However, the 
statistical test (Table 2) shows that the only significant difference is in question G4: I am 
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confident that if I give my personal information to a bank, they use it appropriately. Thus, 
there is no evidence for our hypothesis. This is not in line with Venkatesh et al. (2003, 2012). 
In addition, it was observed that men chose extreme answers more than women, but we did 
not test this. 
Table 2 
AA = Average answer of a given respondent group, 
The difference of the observations between groups can be: 
NS   = Non-significant 
NAS  = Nearly almost significant 
AS   = Almost significant  
S     = Significant 
VS   = Very significant. 
CC  contingency coefficient 
Х2 (khi2) test variable 
P  random error 
Diff  statistical significance of a difference 
Test  Pearson‟s Chi-Square test for independence 
Difference between the answers of the genders in the basic sample (N=127). 
Question AA(women) AA(men) CC Х2 P       Diff 
G1  2,6  2,9  0,143 2,6 0,107  NS 
G2  2,7  2,9  0,128 2,07 0,151  NS 
G3  3,0  2,6  0,007 0,01 0,936  NS 
G4  3,0  3,8  0,268 9,78 0,002  S 
G5  3,7  3,9  0,028 0,1 0,750  NS 
G6  3,7  3,6  0,041 0,21 0.647  NS 
N1  1,7  1,8  0,084 0,89 0,345  NS 
N2  3,1  2,5  0,14 2,52 0,112  NS 
N3  2,5  2,3  0.016 0,03 0,860  NS 
N4  2,3  2,2  0,04 0,2 0,657  NS 
L1  3,1  3,0  0,027 0,09 0,761  NS 
L2  2,4  2,5  0,057 0,41 0,524  NS 
L3  3,2  2,7  0,097 1,19 0,276  NS 
L4  2,4  2,2  0,075 0,72 0,397  NS 
L5  3,0  2,6  0,14 2,52 0,112  NS 
L6  4,9  4,1  0,206 5,6 0,018  AS 
L7  3,0  2,6  0,106 1,44 0,231  NS 
L8  3,7  3,6  0,001 0 0,996  NS 
L9  4,0  3,8  0,013 0,02 0,885  NS 
L10  3,3  3,1  0,027 0,09 0,765  NS 
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Next, the answers of the respondents living in the Finnish capital area were compared with 
the answers of those living in other parts of Finland. Our hypothesis was that people in the 
capital area are more interested in new insurance features. From Table 3 we see that the 
difference is almost significant in question L8: An insurance company may get information 
about my living habits to rate the premium, and the people from outside the capital area are 
more positive. There are three “nearly almost significant” differences where those from 
outside the capital area are more positive towards new features, and all the other differences 
are nonsignificant. Clearly, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, so there is no evidence for 
our alternative hypothesis. 
Table 3 
Difference between the answers of the respondents living in the capital area of Finland and 
the respondents from other parts of Finland (N=127) 
CA = capital area, RF = rest of Finland. 
Question AA(CA) AA(RF) CC Х2 P       Diff 
G1  2,5  2,8  0,098 1,21 0,271  NS 
G2  2,7  2,9  0,058 0,42 0,517  NS 
G3  2,7  2,8  0,061 0,47 0,494  NS 
G4  3,7  3,3  0,152 2,97 0,085        NAS 
G5  4,2  3,6  0,107 1,45 0,229  NS 
G6  3,9  3,6  0,074 0,69 0,407  NS 
N1  1,5  1,8  0,142 2,55 0,110  NS 
N2  3,1  2,7  0,132 2,21 0,137  NS 
N3  2,4  2,3  0,032 0,12 0,724  NS 
N4  2,3  2,3  0,021 0,06 0,814  NS 
L1  3,4  2,9  0,06 0,44 0,506  NS 
L2  2,6  2,4  0,024 0,07 0,786  NS 
L3  2,9  3,0  0,017 0,04 0,849  NS 
L4  2,3  2,3  0,055 0,39 0,534  NS 
L5  2,8  2,8  0,067 0,56 0,455  NS 
L6  5,0  4,3  0,15 2,88 0,090        NAS 
L7  3,3  2,7  0,15 2,86 0,091      NAS 
L8  4,2  3,5  0,204 5,43 0,020  AS 
L9  4,1  3,8  0,042 0,22 0,637  NS 
L10  3,5  3,1  0,088 0,98 0,322  NS 
 
In the next comparison, the basic sample was divided into four salary classes with boundaries 
1.000, 2.500, and 5.000 euros. Our hypothesis was that people with good salary are more 
interested in new insurance features. In the general questions, all the differences (Table 4) 
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were non-significant. In the nonlife question N2 (the driven kilometres should affect the 
motor insurance premium) the difference is significant, and the second lowest salary class is 
clearly most positive. In question L10 (I would be interested in life insurance which would 
give me benefits according to my physical activity and living habits) the difference was 
almost significant, and the most positive answers came from the lowest and the highest salary 
class. Additionally, there was one nearly almost significant difference, and all the other 
differences were non-significant. Therefore, we failed to find support for our hypothesis. 
Table 4 
Difference between the answers of the respondents in various salary classes (N=127) 
Salary level €/month: 
Class 1 Below 1.000 
Class 2 Between 1.000 and 2.499 
Class 3 Between 2.500 and 4.999 
Class 4 Over 5.000 
Question AA(1) AA(2) AA(3) AA(4) CC Х2 P  Diff 
G1  2,9 2,6 2,7 3,0 0,111 1,53 0,676  NS 
G2  2,8 2,6 2,8 3,5 0,173 3,8 0,284  NS 
G3  2,9 2,7 2,7 2,8 0,067 0,55 0,908  NS 
G4  3,1 3,8 3,1 2,5 0,168 3,59 0,310  NS 
G5  3,5 3,9 3,9 3,5 0,117 1,72 0,633  NS 
G6  3,7 3,8 3,6 3,3 0,099 1,22 0,748  NS 
N1  2,1 1,5 1,9 2,0 0,229 6,74 0,081         NAS 
N2  3,6 2,3 3,1 3,4 0,33 15,16 0,002   S 
N3  2,9 2,0 2,6 2,8 0,22 6,19 0,103  NS 
N4  2,7 1,9 2,6 2,4 0,159 3,21 0,361  NS 
L1  2,7 2,8 3,2 3,5 0,14 2,45 0,485  NS 
L2  2,7 2,5 2,3 2,7 0,105 1,38 0,711  NS 
L3  3,0 3,1 2,7 3,5 0,158 3,11 0,375  NS 
L4  2,2 2,3 2,2 2,4 0,089 1 0,802  NS 
L5  2,9 2,9 2,6 2,7 0,15 2,87 0,413  NS 
L6  3,9 4,3 4,8 5,0 0,194 4,84 0,184  NS 
L7  2,5 2,8 2,9 2,8 0,087 0,94 0,817  NS 
L8  3,6 3,7 3,5 3,5 0,032 0,13 0,988  NS 
L9  4,1 4,1 3,6 3,4 0,187 4,58 0,205  NS 
L10  2,2 3,4 3,6 2,4 0,269 9,64 0,022  AS 
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Aged Sample and Student Sample: Comparison 
The average answers of those members of the basic sample who are at least 50 years old 
(N=90) and the student sample (N=69, average age 24) were compared, see Table 5. The 
hypothesis here is that young and more educated people are in favour of new features more 
than the older. 
In the general questions this is true: In almost all questions there is at least some significance 
in the difference between the sample answers, and in questions G4: A bank uses 
appropriately my personal information, G5: An insurance company uses appropriately a 
customer‟s information, and G6: I am willing to deliver actively personal information to get 
benefits from bank and insurance services, the difference was very significant. 
In nonlife questions the differences were nonsignificant, but in life questions the differences 
of the average answers are again in most cases almost significant or very significant. The 
differences were very significant in questions L8 (an Insurance company may get information 
about my living habits to rate the premium), L9 (the insurance company may get my health 
related information to rate the premium, and L10 (I would be interested in life insurance 
which would give me benefits according to my physical activity and living habits). The 
students were more interested in new insurance features in most questions. Thus, the data 
supported our hypothesis in most cases. 
The above differences are in line with the observation that age is a significant factor in 
explaining IT acceptance (Venkatesh et al., 2012). Here an additional factor is education. 
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Table 5 
Difference between the answers of the subgroup of at least 50 years old respondents of the 
basic sample (N=90) and the student group (N=68), Pearson‟s Chi-Square test for 
independence. 
Question AA(at l. 50) AA(stud.) CC Х2 P  Diff 
G1  2,7  2,7  0,15 3,65 0,056      NAS 
G2  2,8  2,7  0,159 4,08 0,044  AS 
G3  2,8  2,4  0,128 2,65 0,104  NS 
G4  3,7  2,5  0,32 18,18 0  VS 
G5  3,8  2,6  0,278 14,31 0  VS 
G6  3,8  2,5  0,333 19,65 0  VS 
N1  1,7  2,0  0,034 0,18 0,669  NS 
N2  2,8  2,6  0,035 0,2 0,658  NS 
N3  2,3  2,3  0,065 0,67 0,414  NS 
N4  2,2  2,6  0,073 0,86 0,355  NS 
L1  3,1  3,2  0,027 0,11 0,737  NS 
L2  2,5  1,9  0,155 3,92 0,048  AS 
L3  3,1  2,2  0,16 4,13 0,042  AS 
L4  2,4  1,9  0,072 0,83 0,361  NS 
L5  2,8  2,3  0,131 2,76 0,097     NAS 
L6  4,5  3,9  0,161 4,26 0,039  AS 
L7  2,7  2,2  0,194 6,19 0,013  AS 
L8  3,7  2,4  0,269 12,43 0  VS 
L9  3,9  2,4  0,31 16,87 0  VS 
L10  3,3  2,2  0,298 15,45 0  VS  
 
Basic Sample: Free Answers 
One can observe from the respondents‟ free answers (Appendix 2) that the majority of the 
comments were critical or even negative although the answer scores were on the average 
relatively positive towards incentive based insurances. The explanation is probably the 
empirical fact that respondents giving positive answers often give fewer comments than those 
giving negative answers. Here the respondents suspected in many free answers that the 
insurance company would be the only winner in the new type of insurances. 
It is important to notice that an insurance company does not control an insured customer just 
for its own benefit, but careful driving behaviour saves both the car and the chauffer‟s nerves, 
not to talk about improved traffic safety, and health incentives of life or health insurance 
promote a better life. We can talk about a real Win-Win situation. Thus, questioning the Win-
Win-situation indicates cognitive biases among respondents. This emphasises the role of 
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experiments in analysing insurance systems and products as described e.g. in Richter et al. 
(2014). Another important aspect is the reduction of complexity in a customer‟s decision 
process, see e.g. Theil (2003). 
One can also observe from the free answers that the respondents value exercise and sports 
related discounts as bonuses of smart or incentive type of insurance policies (gyms, 
swimming halls, badminton, etc.). Certain insurance companies also offer more broadly 
defined wellness bonuses like cinema tickets, health food and drink tickets and so on. These 
kinds of bonuses did not appear in the spontaneous answers of this study. 
Among the negative comments may be mentioned the following: Data security problems 
were raised; general confidence for the suggested system was much lower among older 
respondents; the arrangement is too complicated to function properly; there are practical 
problems in verifying the improved health status of a customer; people are put into uneven 
positions (unfairly); health markers do not always give a right picture of a person‟s health 
status. 
One respondent raised a philosophical question “An insurance company has to be an 
enterprise and able to take risks”. An insurance company really exists to take its clients‟ risks. 
Apparently the respondent criticizes insurance companies‟ trend to evaluate individual 
customers‟ risks as exactly as possible to manage the individual risk and set a right premium. 
In return of complying with the terms and conditions and lowering the risk for the insurer the 
customer obtains a premium discount. 
Incentive based insurances are a way to individualize underwriting and premium rating. This 
can be considered as a countermeasure to regulation (e.g. the EU gender-neutral rule), which 
tends to make insurance business less individual, i.e. more collective. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
To study opinions of Finnish customers on incentive based insurances we set up an inquiry 
consisting of general, nonlife specific and life specific questions during the autumn 2016. 
Statistical tests were carried out to find out if there were significant differences between the 
answers of different samples. 
As a summary, the next conclusions can be drawn from the inquiry results: 
 The respondents replied the nonlife insurance questions quite positively. A vast majority 
of respondents think that the bonus system in motor insurance is really good. 
 Life insurance questions mostly received slightly positive scores, but the majority of the 
free answers were negative. The majority of respondents think that residence location as a 
tariff factor is a really bad system. 
 Cross-selling related questions received slightly positive scores. 
 There was hardly any difference between the answers of different genders, different 
residence locations or different income levels. 
 The sample of young with high education (student sample) replied to the following 
questions very significantly more positively than the senior sample (at least 50 years old): 
 Nonlife and life: I am confident that if I give my personal information to a bank, 
they will use it appropriately. 
 Nonlife and life: I am confident that if I give my personal information regarding 
e.g. my health, driving habits or living habits to an insurance company, they will 
use it appropriately. 
 Nonlife and life: Considering bank and insurance services overall, I would be 
willing to give my personal information to obtain benefits from bank and insurance 
services. 
 Life: An insurance company may get information about my living habits to rate the 
premium. 
 Life: An insurance company may get my health related information to rate the 
premium. 
 Life: I would be interested in life insurance which would give me benefits 
according to my physical activity and living habits. 
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This underlines the differences between these customer segments when it comes to delivery 
of personal data. 
Many respondents were interested in discounted or free vouchers for exercise and sports 
related activities and not only premium discounts. Unexpectedly, the real Win-Win situation 
related to incentive based insurance was questioned indicating cognitive biases. 
This study finds that successful development of incentive based insurance products requires 
that insurers study and test carefully their potential customers‟ opinions. This emphasises the 
role of experiments and inquiries in insurance product development work. Another important 
aspect is the reduction of complexity in a customer‟s decision process. 
More and more insurance companies are designing or piloting incentive based insurances 
described in this paper. Therefore, it would be interesting to repeat a study on customers‟ 
opinions on these kinds of products within a couple of years. Also regulatory aspects would 
be an important open issue. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Survey Questions  
Background questions 
Age in full years 
Gender 
Place of residence 
Salary level €/month: 
 Below 1.000 
 Between 1.000 and 2.499 
 Between 2.500 and 4.999 
 Over 5.000 
The opinion on the following statements is given as 1,2,…,6, where 1=definitely yes and 
6=absolutely not. 
General Questions 
G1 Rewarding the use of banking services as decreased insurance premiums is a good 
principle. 
G2  Rewarding the use of insurances as lower costs of banking services is a good principle 
G3 Claim probability should affect insurance premium level and the claim payment 
G4  I am confident that if I give my personal information to a bank, they use it 
appropriately 
G5 I am confident that if I give my personal information regarding e.g. my health, driving 
habits or living habits to an insurance company, they use it appropriately. 
G6 Considering bank and insurance services overall, I would be willing to give my 
personal information to reach benefits from bank and insurance services. 
Nonlife Insurance Related Questions 
N1 The bonus system in motor insurance (rewarding a small number of claims in 
premiums of later years) is a good principle. 
N2 In motor insurance the driven kilometres should affect the premium. 
N3 In motor insurance the driving habit should affect the premium. 
N4 In private household insurances (like e.g. home insurance) the same kind of bonus 
system as in motor insurance would be a good premium rating method. 
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Life Insurance Related Questions 
L1 In health insurance the same kind of bonus system as in motor insurance would be a 
good premium rating method. 
L2 I approve health declarations when buying a life insurance 
L3 Age should affect the premium of a life insurance. 
L4 Smoking/non-smoking should affect the premium of a life insurance. 
L5 My health condition should affect the premium of a life insurance. 
L6 Residence location should affect the premium of a life insurance. 
L7 My living habits promoting my health could affect the premium of a life insurance. 
L8 It is acceptable that an insurance company gets information about my living habits to 
rate the premium. 
L9 It is acceptable that an insurance company gets my health related information like 
blood pressure, cholesterol level or BMI to rate the premium. 
L10 I would be interested in life insurance which would give me benefits according to my 
physical activity and living habits. 
L11 If you answered 1, 2 or 3 to question L10, what form of reward would interest you 
(what would motivate you to use this service): premium discount, discount from 
services related to physical exercise or wellness, earning wider insurance coverage, 
possibility to monitor your own activity, living habit and health, other, what? 
L12 If you answered 4,5 or 6 to question L10, what factors would possibly prevent you 
from using this service: concern about whether right conclusions are made based on 
this information, concern about data security when giving health information, concern 
about not getting any benefits by giving out my health information, concern about 
conditions for  rewarding being too complex, difficulty in monitoring health 
information, concern about whether living habits and health are in sufficient level to 
achieving benefits, other, what? 
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Appendix 2: Examples of Free Answers 
In question L11 respondents who were interested in “smart” life insurances were asked to tell 
what form of reward would interest them. Here are some of the answers: 
Premium Discount 
“If wealth status is better, one can get a discount, but worse health should not be penalized.” 
“ 20-30 % discount from premiums” 
“Our insurances have been bundled and we get mighty bonuses already now. I do not know if 
I could still raise them.” 
“Non-smoking discount -5%, no drinking -5%, normal BMI -5%” 
“Discounts by changing living habits would increase interest in healthy life.” 
“Discount factors weight, stopping smoking, amount of exercise and cholesterol” 
“Condition in relation to age would be noted in premiums.” 
“This would incentivize health maintenance” 
“Because I have lived peaceful life without partying, smoking and risk factors like dangerous 
hobbies, I would like to have discounts. My relatives have also lived very long lives, which 
should be taken account as well.” 
”A condition card would be an evidence of physical activity in everyday life.” 
“A stepwise monitoring by heart rate” 
“After health examinations the premium would be adjusted (decrease/increase)” 
“Premium discount could be 10-30 % considering living habits and activity.” 
Discount from Services 
“Discount from a gym card? I do not know, I use “services” to promote my welfare and 
condition which can be even free (nature, dancing).” 
“Discount to gym would be good.” 
“Bonus could also be in the form of an exercise card (Smartum et al.)” 
“I do not care, because I spend my spare free time anyway in the nature where I get both 
physical and spiritual well-being.” 
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“Discounts from welfare and condition checks” 
“Free condition course, if one’s condition improves, no discounts is needed!” 
“Incentivizes exercise and healthy life habits.” 
“Difficult to maintain fairness between residence areas” 
Wider Insurance Coverage 
”travel insurance as a side cover” 
“Possibility for insurance cover for an elderly person” 
Possibility to Monitor One’s Own Activity 
“Don’t the companies offer this service already now?” 
“I am not interested in the continuous monitoring of my own health.” 
“A very good idea (several comments).” 
“Modern monitors and cloud services make it possible to assess and follow the level of the 
customer.” 
“All the tests to be paid by the insurance company.” 
“Possibility to follow one’s condition is a good benefit.” 
“I think that everybody can “monitor” one’s condition, health and living habits by what 
he/she eats, how spends his/her leisure time and what does to maintain his/her condition.” 
Other Possible Bonuses? 
“Free tickets to swimming halls and gyms.” 
“Badminton tickets, personal trainer sessions” 
“Anything to improve condition” 
In question L12 respondents who were not so interested in “smart” life insurances were asked 
to tell what would possibly prevent them from using this service. Here are some of the 
answers: 
Concern About Wrong Conclusions 
“Relatively small choices in living habits may get too high significance” 
”Does the customer submit the information correctly?” 
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“Misuse of the system” 
“The insurance company would dictate the interpretations of the data” 
“Whichever data can be transformed to correspond one’s purposes” 
“Medicine is not always objective: cholesterol levels can differ even if there were no 
problems.” 
“Insurance companies have only one target: to increase their own profits, so they cannot 
possibly make objective decisions in this respect but use every means to increase premiums.” 
“Here again doctors of an insurance company draw conclusions without seeing a person” 
“Life is never totally predictable - a smoker can have good condition and a very healthy 
person may all of a sudden die without any warning. In life there are no guarantees. 
Therefore, drawing always right conclusions is impossible.” 
Concern About Data Security 
“Systems are often down and hacking is increasing” 
“Data security failures probable (several comments)” 
“A critical issue, but, on the other hand, too much security prevents many good developments 
of the system” 
Concern About Not Getting any Benefits by Giving out Health Information 
“The insurance company is the sole beneficiary of the arrangement” 
“The benefit could be offset by the costs of data gathering, and it would not be seen in the 
respondent’s premiums” 
“Insurance companies try to increase their profits by any means. I do not believe that lower 
premium would be charged”  
“There is no sense in gathering useless information” 
Concern About Conditions for Rewarding Being too Complex 
“There is always some loophole to deny a claim” 
“Both bank and insurance conditions are too complex already today” 
“Customers would be put into unequal position” 
“Depends on how well they are designed. Cf.Nobel prize for contract theory.” 
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Difficulty in Monitoring Health Information 
“Who would do that as it is nowadays impossible to get to a doctor even if you wanted?” 
“Taking a blood sample to an insurance company is by no means a nice idea – in dispute 
situations surely the companies would win.” 
“What obligations does the monitoring bring to an insured? How is my health followed and 
how often?” 
”Modern techniques and medical centres offer good possibilities” 
“Fair health monitoring is difficult and complicated” 
Concern About Whether Living Habits and Health are in Sufficient Level to Achieve 
Benefits 
“No worries” (several comments) 
“A person’s living habits and health change all the time and it would be difficult to control 
how he/she would keep the agreed living habits. 
“Only top athletes could even in theory get small premium discounts” 
“This could have a positive effect (“living habits renovation”) or negative (a customer 
changes companies or gives up the insurance)” 
Other Possible Difficulties 
“Driving behaviour is up to a person him/herself while a person cannot affect growing old 
and getting ill. Mandatory screening of people’s genome and its effects to future people’s 
lives is a horror scenario.” 
“People are classified into unequal positions” 
“Can a cured disease be an obstacle for getting an insurance? Is the premium going to be 
raised?” 
“Too personal matters should not be disclosed” 
“Sporty but dangerous hobbies could be treated more favourably than obesity, smoking, etc. 
In spite of healthy habits one’s health can deteriorate. Premium rating factors should not 
include health markers like blood pressure, BMI, etc.” 
“If you change insurance companies often, they all have your health information. This is not 
good!” 
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“The definition of healthy living habits? If insurance company’s and my definitions coincided, 
incentive based insurance would be OK for me. If the insurance defines healthy living habits 
according to the official practise, our views on health and good living habits differ totally. 
Healthy diet is also a thing I would probably sharply disagree with the insurance company. I 
would pay more for my insurance even if I live healthy and I am never ill, because my view 
differs from the official one. This fact destroys incentives for me.” 
“For a young woman pressures on looks and living habits are already otherwise terrible. It 
would feel shocking if some kilos of overweight or amount of exercise would be penalized. 
Many cannot do anything about their health. This kind of system would set people into 
unequal positions.” 
“Right living habits are not a guarantee for health status!” 
“I am afraid that a big proportion of people are directed outside fairly priced insurances” 
“Information will later be sold further to a third party or it will later be used in a connection 
which an insured person could not think about when buying a policy.” 
“As far as I know, my age is a show stopper for life insurances. At least the previous ones 
have expired. I missed the train!” 
“When buying an insurance policy a person’s activity may have been good. In life, however, 
one faces challenges/adversity and taking care of one’s condition gets less attention. 
Consequently, the insurance company may consider that the customer has not fulfilled the 
insurance terms regarding activity. Insurance companies are not especially well trusted in 
these kinds of matters.” 
“An insurance company has to be an enterprise and able to take risks” 
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